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INTRODUCTION

In the May 2014 decision of Plumhoff v. Rickard,' the U.S. Supreme Court
squarely endorsed its 2004 decision in Brosseau v. Haugen,2 which epitomizes
the more legalistic line of the Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence. Under
the Brosseau-Plumhoffapproach, the U.S. Supreme Court evaluated the liability

of low-level officers in Section 1983 cases based upon an analysis of whether or
not a particular defendant's alleged conduct was previously held to be unlawful
by relevant federal appellate court authority.3 Notably absent in both Brosseau
and Plumhoff was any discussion of whether the appellate court authority in
question would have been known to a reasonable officer in the defendant's
position, and this Article contends that it clearly would not have been.
This Article argues that the Brosseau-Plumhoffapproach is not equal to the

task of evaluating the liability of individual Section 1983 defendants, many of
whom are low-level state and local governmental officers who almost certainly

do not read federal appellate court decisions. This is significant because in
establishing the basic qualified immunity standard in the 1982 decision of

The author is currently serving as career law clerk to the Honorable Michael P. Mills, U.S.
District Court Judge for the Northern District of Mississippi, and has served as a federal district law
clerk for the past fourteen years. The author is grateful to law student Tyson Attaway for his
assistance in proofreading this Article.
1.
134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014).
2.
543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam); see also Plumhoff 134 S. Ct. at 2023 (stating that
Brosseau "squarely demonstrates that no clearly established law precluded petitioners' conduct at
the time in question").
3.
See Plumhoff 134 S. Ct. at 2023 (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080,
2083-84 (2011)); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)).
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4
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
the Supreme Court stressed that qualified immunity
unless
the
defendant violated "clearly established statutory or
should apply
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 5 More
importantly, the Supreme Court in Harlow established an "extraordinary
circumstances" defense, discussed in depth below, which allows a defendant to
claim immunity in cases where the defendant neither knew, nor should have
known, of the authority in question.6
The existence of the extraordinary circumstances defense, as well as the
context and the plain language of the Harlow decision, make it clear that the
Supreme Court did not intend for that decision's legalistic analysis of precedent
to form the governing qualified immunity standard in cases involving low-level
officers. This Article contends that by assessing the liability of low-level
officers based upon appellate court precedent of which they are almost certainly
unaware, the Brosseau-Plumhoff approach moves the qualified immunity
analysis away from factors which are actually relevant to officers on the job and
into a legalistic after the fact debate among lawyers and judges, which provides a
poor basis for evaluating the liability of many Section 1983 defendants.
Brosseau and Plumhoff each involved shootings by police officers of
criminal suspects who were attempting to evade arrest in vehicles. Qualified
immunity existed in both cases, based upon the Supreme Court's conclusion that
relevant federal appellate court precedent had not clearly established shootings
under similar circumstances to be unlawful. This Article acknowledges that the
results in Brosseau and Plumhoff were reasonable, and it may be that the cases
involved a sufficiently distinct and common factual scenario that a legalistic
standard was adequate. It is this writer's experience, however, that many other
Section 1983 cases involve less distinct factual scenarios, where a legalistic
analysis of precedent fails to provide workable standards for determining the
liability of individual defendants.
Section 1983 cases frequently arise out of simple acts such as a police
officer's physical restraint of a suspect in the course of making an arrest. 9 In
such cases, the plaintiff generally contends that the defendant officer used an
amount of force that was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
and that the plaintiff suffered significant physical injuries as a result.' 0 While the
legal inquiry in this context may seem simple enough, the actual result may
depend upon a host of factors. These factors may include, but are certainly not

457 U.S. 800 (1982).
4.
5. Id. at 819.
6. Id. (establishing a specific defense which could be raised by defendants when they were
able to demonstrate that they "neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard").
See Plumhoff 134 S. Ct. at 2017-18 (citations omitted); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 195-97.
7.
See Plumhoff 134 S. Ct. at 2023-24 (citations omitted); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199-201
8.
(citations omitted).
9.
See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388-90 (1989) (recounting injuries sustained
by plaintiff in the course of detention by police).
10. Seeidat395.
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limited to, the precise nature of the force employed by the officer-as to which
subtle differences may be crucial, the extent to which the suspect was known to
have a history of violence, whether the suspect was under the influence of drugs
or alcohol, whether the suspect was reasonably believed to be in close proximity
to a deadly weapon, and whether there were innocent bystanders in close
proximity to the altercation who were threatened by it."
The list of factors that may affect the objective reasonableness of an
officer's actions in the typical Section 1983 excessive force case is quite lengthy,
and this writer can state from experience that attempting to judge the actions of
an officer in a particular case on the basis of federal appellate court precedent
frequently seems like an exercise in futility. First of all, poring through the vast
number of Fourth Amendment cases to find ones that are relevant is a daunting
task, and many lawyers-particularly plaintiffs' lawyers-will lack the resources
to do a truly thorough job in this regard. Even if research reveals cases which
are at least somewhat similar, there are almost always significant distinguishing
factors from one case to another, and the law is quite unclear regarding how
closely on point precedent needs to be in order to be deemed relevant.
It should also be noted that technologies and procedures used by police
officers and other public employees are constantly evolving and, as such, they
may get well ahead of the legal precedent on a particular issue. For example,
this Article raises a hypothetical involving the repeated tasing of a suspect by
police officers. At one time, tasers were a new technology and there were, of
course, no federal appellate court decisions dealing with them. This raises the
risk that, under the Brosseau-Plumhoffapproach, defendants may enjoy a certain
degree of legal impunity when dealing with new technologies and procedures,
which have not yet been addressed by precedent. Indeed, this risk is present, in
varying degrees, for virtually any novel fact pattern, which has not yet been
addressed by federal appellate courts.
Although informed by the writer's experiences as a career federal district
law clerk, this Article will attempt to make its case largely through the words of
Supreme Court Justices whose views are, obviously, entitled to far more
deference. The Article will discuss how, in the 1975 decision of Wood v.
Strickland,12 four Supreme Court Justices objected to considering the analysis of
federal appellate precedent that now forms the sole inquiry under the BrosseauPlumoff approach.' 3 At the time Wood was decided, the qualified immunity

11. See id. at 396 (holding that to decide the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of use of
force, "the proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the subject poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade arrest by flight"); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985) (holding that when
deciding Fourth Amendment reasonableness, "the question was whether the totality of the
circumstances justified a particular sort of search or seizure").
12. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
13. Id. at 329 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This Article will discuss
how certain other Supreme Court decisions-most notably Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738
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standard was largely based upon a subjective inquiry into whether the defendant
"took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury," 1 4 and, at the time, not a single Justice
objected to this inquiry. 15 It is therefore striking that the Supreme Court
overruled this subjective portion of the qualified immunity inquiry a mere seven
years later in Harlow, and adopted as its sole standard the objective analysis of
precedent which four Justices recently found to be objectionable. 16
Harlow dealt with qualified immunity in the context of claims of political
retaliation on the part of aides to President Nixon,17 and this Article will seek to
demonstrate that the Supreme Court's rejection of the subjective inquiry in that
case was largely and expressly based upon considerations, including separation
of powers concerns, which are unique to claims against high executive officials.
This Article will contend that, while the Supreme Court's analysis in Harlow
was plainly tailored to claims against such high-level officials, the Court erred in
not more narrowly tailoring its actual holding to that context. While Harlow can
thus be faulted for making an overbroad holding, the decision did contain an
escape valve of sorts, in the form of the aforementioned extraordinary
circumstances defense, 8 which was essentially ignored in both Brosseau and
Plumhoff
It must be emphasized that this Article is not calling for the application of
Harlow's extraordinary circumstances defense to cases involving low-level
officers such as those in Brosseau and Plumhoff To the contrary, and as
discussed in greater detail below, such a literal application of Harlow's holding
would seemingly grant blanket immunity to low-level officers in a wide variety
of contexts because they will generally be unaware of the state of federal
appellate court precedent on a given issue. Rather, this Article contends that the
very existence of the extraordinary circumstances defense should make
undeniable what already seems clear enough from Harlow's context and
language: that its legalistic analysis of precedent was not intended to form the
governing qualified immunity standard in cases involving low-level officers.
This Article contends that the Supreme Court should first recognize that
Harlow's analysis was not intended to apply to low-level officers, and thereupon
set about defining a qualified immunity standard that does make sense in this

(2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958))-have employed a far less legalistic
approach.
14. Wood, 420 U.S. at 322.
15. See id at 330 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (approving the
subjective element of qualified immunity while dissenting on other grounds).
16. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
17. See id at 802.
18. See Plumboff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023-24 (2014) (citations omitted) (finding
qualified immunity applied because there were no clear cases showing that conduct was
unconstitutional); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam) (finding qualified
immunity where there was not a clear set of cases establishing that the conduct violated the Fourth
Amendment).
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context. This Article suggests that a good starting point for such a standard lies
in language from one post-Harlow Supreme Court decision, which has been
repeatedly quoted by lower federal courts in the qualified immunity context. In
the 1986 decision of Malley v. Briggs,19 the Supreme Court wrote that qualified
immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law." 20
The Malley language has been so well received by federal judges because it
captures the essence of the proper c9ualified immunity inquiry, at least as many
judges would like it to be captured. Unfortunately, the Malley language makes
reference to the subjective state of mind of the defendant, and generally bears
little resemblance to the Supreme Court's actual qualified immunity standard.22
In this sense, the Malley language has served as an "off the menu special" of
sorts, which seems to give federal judges license to consider the sort of factors
which they are naturally predisposed to consider in qualified immunity cases.
The fact remains that the language in Malley is merely dicta, which is in evident
conflict with the Supreme Court's actual qualified immunity standard, at least as
applied in Brosseau and Plumhoff 2 3
This Article contends that one of the fundamental defects in the BrosseauPlumhoff approach is that it reflects an appellate bias which vastly overestimates
the extent to which federal appellate courts may "clearly establish" law regarding
the mgriad factual scenarios which district judges encounter in Section 1983
cases. The typical Fourth Amendment excessive force case, for example, may
involve an almost infinite number of actions by the suspect and counteractions
by police, and the results in such cases often depend upon subtle factual
distinctions which it is unrealistic to expect federal appellate court precedent to
clearly address. Brosseau and Plumhoff instruct that, when a review of federal
appellate court precedent fails to provide clarity, then that in and of itself
resolves the qualified immunity issue with no further inquiry into the merits of
the case required.25
As will be seen, the Supreme Court's recent qualified immunity approach
has resulted in the application of the exact same analysis to calculated decisions
of the U.S. Attorney General, 2 6 as it has to decisions made by low-level police
officers in emergency situations. In both contexts, the Supreme Court has
essentially instructed federal judges to crack open their federal and Supreme

19.

475 U.S. 335 (1986).

20. Id at 341.
21. See, e.g., Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1448, 1450 (6th Cir. 1997) (providing multiple
citations to Malley, and finding qualified immunity applied); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d
Cir. 1987) (also citing Malley at length and finding that qualified immunity applied).
22. See Plumhoff 134 S. Ct. at 2023 (citations omitted); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201.
23. See Plumhoff 134 S. Ct. at 2023 (citations omitted); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201.
24. See Plumhoff 134 S. Ct. at 2023 (citations omitted); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201.
25. See Plumhoff 134 S. Ct. at 2023 (citations omitted); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198-201
(citations omitted); al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083-85 (citations omitted).
26. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083-85 (2011) (citations omitted).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 6
548

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 66: 543

Court reporters and evaluate the liability of individual defendants based upon the
legal precedents contained therein. 27 This approach might be appropriate for
evaluating the Attorney General's calculated decisions, but it seems quite
inadequate for assessing the liability of low-level police officers in emergency
situations.
Both Brosseau and Plumhoff garnered large majorities among Supreme
28
Court Justices, and it is not clear that the Court is even aware of the concerns
regarding the basic relevance of its analysis to the low-level officers who form
the bulk of individual defendants in Section 1983 cases.29 As discussed below,
this appears to result partly from the fact that, factually speaking, neither
Brosseau nor Plumhoff were particularly close cases, and qualified immunity
would likely have been found to exist under any standard. It is submitted that
clear cases, such as Brosseau and Plumhoff, are ones in which bad law
frequently gets written. In such cases the result seems clear enough, and it is
easy to overlook concerns about whether the Court's analysis will serve courts
well in future cases. Bringing attention to these concerns is the purpose of this
Article.
Qualified immunity is, from a practical perspective, one of the doctrines in
federal civil litigation that matters the most. Federal constitutional claims are
generally litigated through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and plaintiffs are, in many cases,
forced to proceed solely against individual defendants. 3 This is because U.S.
Supreme Court precedent provides that municipalities are only liable for their
own unlawful conduct, and may not be held vicariously liable in Section 1983
cases.32 Additionally, recovery against states is a nonstarter based on both
Eleventh Amendment immunity,33 as well as decisions holding that a state is not
34
a "person" within the meaning of Section 1983.
However, to obtain recovery
against an individual defendant, the plaintiff must first get past the qualified

27. See Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2023 (citations omitted); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198-201
(citations omitted); al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083-85 (citations omitted).
28. See Plumhoff 134 S. Ct. at 2016 (providing only one opinion of the Court with some
difference of opinion, but no dissenting opinions); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 194, 202 (providing a per
curiam opinion with only Justice Stevens dissenting).
29. See Plumhoff 134 S. Ct. at 2023 (citations omitted) (applying legal case-based analysis to
qualified immunity of police officers); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198-201 (citations omitted) (also
applying legal case-based analysis to qualified immunity of police officers).
30.

See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES

§

1.02,

at 1-10 (4th ed. Supp. 2007) (noting a growth in Section 1983 claims, which "often involve[]
difficult questions of constitutional analysis").
31. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, § 1.04[A], at 1-17 (4th ed. Supp. 2011) (noting that, to
assert a claim under Section 1983, "[f]irst, 'the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived
him of a federal right,' and second, 'he must allege that the person who has deprived him of that
right acted under color of state or territorial law' (quoting Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640
(1980))).
32. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City ofN.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
33. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1989); Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 345 (1979).
34. See Will, 491 U.S. at 68-69 (citing Quern, 440 U.S. at 343).
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immunity defense that is almost always raised in cases where the defendant may
not assert some form of absolute immunity.35
This Article makes two primary contentions regarding the Supreme Court's
qualified immunity jurisprudence. The first contention is that the Supreme Court
in Harlow acted unwisely when it chose to completely discard the subjective
inquiry in all qualified immunity cases, instead of merely those cases involving
high-level executive officials. 36 The second contention is that, even considering
Harlow's inherent limitations, the Brosseau-Plumhoffapproach misapplies its
holding by assessing the liability of low-level officers on the basis of federal
appellate court authority of which no reasonable officer would have known. The
Article will discuss these contentions in turn.

1I.

THE

SUPREME COURT MADE A POOR DECISION IN HARLOW WHEN IT
COMPLETELY REMOVED THE SUBJECTIVE INQUIRY FROM THE QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY ANALYSIS.

This Article will begin discussion of its first contention with a proposition
which includes some degree of opinion, but which is believed to be correct. That
proposition is as follows: in deciding whether to grant qualified immunity to an
individual defendant in a Section 1983 case, one of the most important factors
for the typical federal judge is a subjective one relating to the state of mind of the
defendant, in particular, the defendant's intent. More particularly, many-if not
most-federal judges, both trial and appellate, place great importance upon
whether they have before them a defendant who subjectively was simply trying
to perform his job duties as he understood them, or whether the defendant was
motivated by a malicious intent to harm others or a reckless disregard for his
actions.
A simple hypothetical involving a fact pattern quite typical for Section 1983
cases will hopefully illustrate this point. Assume a case in which a criminal
suspect who is fleeing on foot is repeatedly tased by police officers, resulting in
significant physical injuries. The plaintiff alleges, although the defendants
dispute, that he was tased more often than was necessary to subdue him and that
such action was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Now

35. In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment, part of the inquiry is
whether the facts considered "in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury ... show
the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)
(overruled on other grounds). The Supreme Court has held that courts may grant qualified immunity
on the ground that a purported right was not "clearly established" by prior case law, without
resolving the often more difficult question of whether the purported right exists at all. Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-37 (2009). Requiring that a plaintiff allege that a federal right was
violated is noncontroversial, and such requirement is not the subject of this Article. Rather, this
Article deals with what is often referred to as the second part of the qualified immunity standard,
which itself includes two subparts which were set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,457 U.S. 800, 818,
819 (1982).
36. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 6
550

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 66: 543

take that same hypothetical and assume that there is additional proof from
several witnesses that, while tasing the suspect, the officers were laughing,
taunting, and clearly enjoying the suspect's suffering.
Both the Fourth Amendment standard and the qualified immunity standard
are objective ones,37 and, legally speaking, the subjective state of mind of the
defendants should not matter. Yet, this Article will argue this fact does matter to
most federal judges and that it should matter under basic considerations of
fairness and justice. It is argued that an officer who is using his job as an outlet
for his sadistic tendencies should not be treated the same as one who is simply
trying to perform his work duties as he understands them. This Article contends
that a qualified immunity standard which does not allow this distinction to matter
should be reconsidered.
In Harlow, the Supreme Court held that the subjective state of mind of the
defendant was no longer a relevant factor in the qualified immunity analysis, and
that federal judges should instead consider only the objective portion of the
Under Harlow's objective
court's preexisting qualified immunity standard.
analysis a plaintiff must establish, to reiterate, that the employee violated
"clearly established statutoW or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."
Harlow rejected and overruled the Supreme Court's preexisting qualified
immunity standard, which included both objective and subjective components. 40
41
In the 1974 decision of Scheuer v. Rhodes, for example, the Supreme Court
considered the personal liability of the governor of Ohio arising out of the killing
42
In
of four Kent State University students by the Ohio National Guard.
establishing the standard for qualified immunity, the Supreme Court wrote that
"[i]t is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and
in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a
basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the
course of official conduct."4 3 Similarly, in its 1975 decision in Wood,4 the
Supreme Court held that in the context of a suit filed by students against school
officials for allegedly unlawful expulsions that an official is not immune if "he
knew or reasonably should have known that the action ... would
violate ... constitutional rights ... , or if he took the action with the malicious
45
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury."

37.

See id. at 817-18.

38. See id
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 818.
See id. at 815, 818.
416 U.S. 232 (1974).
Id at 234.
Id. at 247-48.
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
Id. at 322.
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Considering Harlow's eventual holding it seems remarkable that, in Wood,
four Supreme Court Justices objected to including an objective legal analysis in
the qualified immunity standard.46 At the time, it was taken for granted that the
subjective state of mind of the defendant should be considered, and four
dissenting Justices argued that it made little sense to augment that subjective test
with an objective inquiry into legal decisions which the defendant in question
almost certainly did not read.47 Specifically, Justice Powell, joined by Justices
Burger, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, wrote as follows:
The holding of the Court on the immunity issue is set forth in the
margin. It would impose personal liability on a school official who
acted sincerely and in the utmost good faith, but who was found-after
the fact-to have acted in 'ignorance . . . of settled, indisputable law.'
Or, as the Court also puts it, the school official must be held to a
standard of conduct based not only on good faith 'but also on
knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his
charges.' Moreover, ignorance of the law is explicitly equated with
'actual malice.' This harsh standard, requiring knowledge of what is
characterized as 'settled, indisputable law,' leaves little substance to the
doctrine of qualified immunity. The Court's decision appears to rest on
an unwarranted assumption as to what lay school officials know or can
know about the law and constitutional rights. These officials will now
act at the peril of some judge or jury subsequently finding that a goodfaith belief as to the applicable law was mistaken and hence
actionable.48
The reader is urged to consider the words of these four Supreme Court
Justices carefully. In his dissent in Wood, Justice Powell objected to federal
courts considering at all what is, under Harlow, the sole inquiry in the present
qualified immunity analysis. 49 Justice Powell and three other Justices felt that
the hallmark of the qualified immunity analysis was a more subjective inquiry
into whether a defendant "acted sincerely and in the utmost good faith,"50 and
this writer submits that, notwithstanding Harlow, this remains true for many
federal judges today.
In Wood, the four dissenting Justices professed great skepticism that a
legalistic analysis of settled precedent could reasonably be applied to Section

46.
omitted).
47.
48.
omitted).
49.
50.

See id. at 327-31 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
See id at 331 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 327-29 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations
See id. at 330 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 328 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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1983 defendants, who generally lack extensive legal training.51 In words that
seem quite prescient in light of Brosseau and Plumhoff, the dissent asserted that:
The Court states the standard of required knowledge in two cryptic
phrases: 'settled, indisputable law' and 'unquestioned constitutional
rights.' Presumably these are intended to mean the same thing, although
the meaning of neither phrase is likely to be self-evident to
constitutional law scholars-much less the average school board
member. 52

It is thus remarkable that a mere seven years later, Justice Powell himself
wrote the court's opinion in Harlow, which reached essentially the opposite
result from what he had advocated in his dissent in Wood.53 It is certainly true
that Supreme Court Justices are at liberty to change their minds, and one could
argue that perhaps Justice Powell simply reconsidered his earlier views regarding
the validity of an objective inquiry into legal precedent and the relevance of
subjective factors in deciding qualified immunity issues.
This Article does not suggest that an analysis of legal precedent has no place
in the qualified immunity analysis, although it clearly seems more relevant in
some contexts than in others. The Article does argue, however, that the Supreme
Court made a poor decision in Harlow when it elected to simply discard, in all
cases, the subjective inquiry that four Justices had recently deemed to be the very
heart of the qualified immunity analysis, and which the entire Court had
endorsed as being a proper part of that analysis.
In so arguing, the writer emphasizes that the Supreme Court in Harlow never
54
rejected the subjective inquiry on its merits.
Rather, the Court was very
upfront that it was discarding the subjective portion of the standard largely
because it was resulting in too many Section 1983 cases surviving summary
judgment and going to trial.s Specifically, the Supreme Court wrote in Harlow
as follows:
The subjective element of the good-faith defense frequently has proved
incompatible with our admonition ... that insubstantial claims should
not proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that disputed questions of fact ordinarily may not be decided

51. See id. at 331 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. Id. at 329 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
54. It can be argued that the Supreme Court's concerns in Harlow regarding separation of
powers issues, discussed below, constituted a rejection of the subjective inquiry, at least partially,
on its merits. If so, then it should be apparent that these concerns are simply irrelevant in the vast
majority of Section 1983 cases.
55. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16 ("The subjective element of the good-faith defense has
proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not proceed to
trial.").
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on motions for summary judgment. And an official's subjective good
faith has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts have
regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury.
In the context of Butz's [sic] attempted balancing of competing values, it
now is clear that substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective
good faith of government officials. Not only are there the general costs
of subjecting officials to the risks of trial-distraction of officials from
their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and
deterrence of able people from public service.
Based upon these factors, the Court in Harlow wrote that:
[W]e conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to
subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens
of broad-reaching discovery.
We therefore hold that government
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.57
In adopting this standard, the Supreme Court reiterated that its goal was to
"avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many
insubstantial claims on summary judgment."5 8 In this sense, Harlow can be
analogized to a chef throwing out half the ingredients in one of his most
important recipes simply because he concluded that it took too long to cook.
While cutting the ingredients in half will no doubt expedite the cooking process,
one must wonder whether the resulting dish will be quite as appetizing. So it is
with the Supreme Court's post-Harlow qualified immunity jurisprudence.
It is abundantly clear that Harlow's decision to discard subjective factors in
qualified immunity cases was based largely upon concerns which are far less
applicable in cases involving low-level officers. Harlow involved allegations of
unconstitutional conduct by aides to President Nixon, specifically, that they had
participated in a conspiracy led by the President to fire the plaintiff for providing
politically damaging testimony before Congress. 59 It is apparent that Harlow's
rejection of a subjective inquiry arose partly from a desire by the Supreme Court
to avoid entangling federal courts in divisive political disputes, where allegations
of subjective malice against political opponents are easy to allege and difficult to

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id at 815-16.
Id. at 817-18.
Id. at 818.
See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 736 (1982).
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prove. 60 Indeed, in the context of high-level politics, the basic issue of what
constitutes malice is often difficult to extricate from political questions that

federal courts have long sought to avoid.
In this vein, the Supreme Court noted in Harlow that separation of powers
concerns partly motivated its decision, writing that:
In suits against a President's closest aides, discovery of this kind
frequently could implicate separation-of-powers concerns. As the Court
.

recognized in United States v. Nixon. .

A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and
to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.
These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for
Presidential communications.

The privilege

is fundamental

to the

operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution.62
Earlier in the decision, the Supreme Court had observed that:
For executive officials in general, however, our cases make plain that
qualified immunity represents the norm. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232 (1974), we acknowledged that high officials require greater
discretionary
those
with
less
complex
protection
than
responsibilities.... In Butz v. Economou, supra, we extended the

approach of Scheuer to high federal officials of the Executive Branch.
Discussing in detail the considerations that also had underlain our
decision in Scheuer, we explained that the recognition of a qualified
immunity defense for high executives reflected an attempt to balance
competing values: not only the importance of a damages remedy to

protect the rights of citizens . . . . but also 'the need to protect officials
who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public
interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.'
Thus, the Supreme Court in Harlow was clearly concerned with the
application of subjective factors in the context of discretionary functions by

60. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817 (citing U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974); Halperin v.
Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214 (1979), aj'd, 452 U.S. 713 (1981)).
61. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (recognizing "the need to protect
officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging
the vigorous exercise of official authority").
62. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817 n.28 (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708).
63. Id at 807 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 504-06; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48
(1974)).
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high-level executive officers, a context that bears little resemblance to the typical
Section 1983 case that district courts face.6 In expressing these concerns, the
Court approvingly quoted a federal appellate decision for the proposition that:
We should not close our eyes to the fact that with increasing frequency
in this jurisdiction and throughout the country plaintiffs are filing suits
seeking damage awards against high government officials in their
personal capacities based on alleged constitutional torts. Each such suit
almost invariably results in these officials and their colleagues being
subjected to extensive discovery into traditionally protected areas, such
as their deliberations preparatory to the formulation of government
policy and their intimate thouht processes and communications at the
presidential and cabinet levels.
It is submitted that this quote, as well as numerous other references in
Harlow to "high government officials," 66 leaves little doubt that the Supreme
Court was motivated largely by factors specific to cases involving such
defendants, and that the decision has been improperly extended to low-level
officers. 67

The contention that Harlow was misapplied in Brosseau and Plumhoff is the
subject of the second part of this Article, and a more extensive discussion of the
strongest proof of such appears below. Briefly, however, the writer reiterates
that the Supreme Court in Harlow provided for an actual defense in cases where
the "official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can
prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal
standard." 68 This is highly significant because however strongly the above
language suggests that the Supreme Court in Harlow was concerned with
immunity, in the context of high-level officials, that language constitutes mere
697
dicta.69 The extraordinary circumstances defense is clearly more than dicta,"
however, and it strongly suggests that Harlow was not intended to apply to lowlevel officers, particularly those facing emergency situations-as in Brosseau
and Plumhoff Indeed, it can scarcely be characterized as extraordinary that a
reasonable police officer would be unaware of the federal appellate court

64. See id. at 807 (citing Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247).
65. Id. at 817 n.29 (quoting Halperin, 606 F.2d at 1214).
66. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 506; Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708; Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247-48;
Halperin, 606 F.2d at 1214.
67. See, e.g., Butz, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (involving a proceeding by the Department of
Agriculture); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 683 & n.3 (involving indictment of White House staff and
presidential aides); Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 234 (involving the governor of Ohio and various officers of
the Ohio National Guard); Halperin, 606 F.2d at 1195 & n.1 (involving ten federal officials,
including former President Richard Nixon and former Attorney General John N. Mitchell).
68. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
69. See id.
70. See id.
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precedent discussed in Brosseau and Plumhoff, it would be extraordinary if an
officer were aware of such authority.
The fact that the Supreme Court in Harlow dealt with qualified immunity in
the context of high-level federal officials does help to explain the Court's sudden
about-face regarding the relative value of subjective and objective evidence in
deciding qualified immunity issues. What is less clear is why the Supreme Court
failed to recognize that a blanket approach to qualified immunity issues was
unwise, and that the Court should narrowly tailor its actual holding to the
analysis which it offered. It is submitted that, as the author of both the Harlow
majority and the Wood dissenting opinions, 7 Justice Powell should have
recognized that his prior concerns that the "average school board member" 72
would be unaware of the status of federal appellate court precedent were no less
valid than they had been seven years earlier in Wood.7 3 Justice Powell should
also have recognized that, while the consideration of subjective proof may raise
separation of powers concerns in cases against high-level executive officers,
such concerns are simply not relevant in the typical Section 1983 case.
Harlow can thus be faulted for a myopic focus on the facts and policy
concerns of the particular case before it, and a failure to recognize-at least in its
actual holding-that qualified immunity raises different concerns in the context
of claims against presidential aides than it does in the typical Section 1983 claim
against a school board member or police officer. The Supreme Court's failure to
narrowly tailor Harlow's holding to a greater extent seems even less excusable in
light of the fact that the decision was expressly based, at least in large part, upon
a simple desire to expedite consideration of qualified immunity issues. 4 To the
extent that the decision was based upon more substantive factors, such as
separation of powers concerns, those factors are not relevant in most Section
1983 cases.
When one is confronted with an admittedly results-oriented decision such as
Harlow, it seems legitimate to question whether the same results could have
been obtained through less disruptive means.75 It is submitted that they could
have. First and foremost, the Supreme Court should have made a more limited

71. See id. at 802-20 (citations omitted); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 327-31 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
72. Wood, 420 U.S. at 329 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. See id. ("One need only look to the decisions of this Court-to our reversals, our
recognition of evolving concepts, and our five-to-four splits-to recognize the hazard of even
informed prophecy as to what are 'unquestioned constitutional rights."').
74. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16 ("The subjective element of the good-faith defense
frequently has proved incompatible with our admonition ... that insubstantial claims should not
proceed to trial.").
75. Indeed, Title VII claims based upon a disparate impact theory are analyzed under a
similar inquiry. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2(k)(1)(A)(ii) & C (2012)) (noting that a plaintiff may prevail on a Title VII discrimination claim
"by showing that the employer refuses to adopt an available alternative employment practice that
has less disparate impact and serves the employer's legitimate needs").
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holding in Harlow, such that subjective factors should not be considered in
deciding qualified immunity issues if consideration of such factors would result
in interference with executive functions or otherwise raise separation of powers
concerns. Alternatively, the Court could have expressly limited its holding to
high-level executive officials, which would have prevented the standard's
subsequent application to contexts where it makes far less sense. If the Supreme
Court deemed the above measures insufficient to expedite the qualified
immunity review process, then the Court could have still allowed consideration
of subjective evidence in appropriate cases, but under tight procedural controls.
For example, instead of barring subjective evidence outright, the Supreme
Court in Harlow could have adopted a pleading standard similar to that which it
later adopted in Iqbal and Twombly requiring that federal judges closely
analyze the plausibility of allegations of malice against individual officers in
Section 1983 cases.78 The Court could have further held that discovery
regarding such subjective factors should only be allowed in cases where the
plausible allegations and circumstances of the case suggest that the discovery
would be likely to produce results. The Supreme Court could have additionally
held that any such discovery that was allowed should be on an expedited basis.
If the foregoing measures were deemed insufficient, then the Supreme Court
could have required that subjective malice be proven by clear and convincing
evidence and held that where the proof failed to establish fact issues in this
regard, summary judgment should be granted.79
The fact of the matter, however, is that the Supreme Court actually did none
of these things in Harlow, instead expressing its holding in language which went
much further than was supported by its own analysis. By simply declaring in
80
Harlow that the subjective good faith of a defendant was henceforth off-limits,
the Supreme Court made an overbroad holding which, literally applied, seeks to
restrict federal judges from considering what many of them regard as highly
relevant evidence in deciding qualified immunity issues. Indeed, Harlow's
holding restricts federal judges from considering evidence which the Supreme
Court justices themselves had unanimously regarded as being an integral part of
the qualified immunity inquiry a mere seven years previously.8 1

76. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
77. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
78. See id. at 556.
79. In Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 594 (1988), the Supreme Court rejected in a 5-4
decision a general requirement that improper motive be proven by clear and convincing evidence in
order to recover under Section 1983. However, it is submitted that the Court might reasonably reach
a differing result as to proof of improper motive in the qualified immunity context, which is
intended to be more deferential to the defendant.
80. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-18 (1982) (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 322 (1974)).
81. Compare Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815, 819 (finding that government officials are generally
entitled to a qualified immunity standard based on "objective terms"), with Wood, 420 U.S. at 322
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Unfortunately, federal district courts and litigants have had to live with the
results of Harlow's one size fits all approach to qualified immunity and, as will
be seen, the Brosseau-Plumhoffapproach exacerbates the situation by doubling
down on the most legalistic aspects of the Harlow analysis. 82 While the
Supreme Court should have framed its holding in Harlow more narrowly, it
seems clear enough from the context and language of the decision, as well as its
extraordinary circumstances defense, 83 that the Court did not intend for its
analysis to apply to low-level officers. The second part of this Article deals with
the Brosseau-Plumhoffapproach's failure to recognize this fact, and discusses
how this failure has left federal district courts with a qualified immunity standard
that is poorly suited for determining the liability of low-level officers in Section
1983 cases.
III. EVEN CONSIDERING THE LIMITATIONS OF THE HARLOW STANDARD, THE
BROSSEAU-PLUMHOFF APPROACH MISAPPLIES IT.

Prior to addressing its contention that the Brosseau and Plumhoff decisions
misapplied Harlow, this Article will contrast those decisions with a recent
decision that employed the Harlow standard in the context in which it was
actually intended to be applied. In the 2011 decision of Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the
Supreme Court considered federal claims arising out of allegations that, in the
aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, Attorney General John
Ashcroft had improperly authorized federal prosecutors and law enforcement
officials to utilize the federal material witness statute on pretextual grounds to
85
detain individuals with suspected ties to terrorist organizations.
The Supreme Court in al-Kidd held that qualified immunity existed, noting
at the time, "not a single judicial opinion had held that pretext could render an
objectively reasonable arrest pursuant to a material-witness warrant
unconstitutional." 86 The aftermath of September 1 Ith, 2001, was clearly an
emergency situation, but there was presumably time for a defendant, with the
resources of the Attorney General, to conduct a review of legal authority to
determine the legality of his proposed actions. 8 7 In this sense, Al-Kidd is the
exception which proves the rule because its facts highlight how Harlow's
analysis of legal precedent does yield a workable and appropriate standard in

(holding that officials are entitled to a qualified good faith immunity defense unless the defendant
"knew or reasonably should have known" the action they took violated an individual's rights).
82. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 205 (2004) (per curiam) (quoting Harlow, 457

U.S. at 818).
83. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
84. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
85. See id. at 2079 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2012)).
86. Id. at 2083.
87. But see id. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that high-level national government
officials such as the Attorney General should be given deference when their office must interpret
conflicting law across multiple federal circuits).
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cases involving high-level officials who are either attorneys or who have access
to legal advice, and can reasonably be expected to have researched the legal
standards governing their conduct prior to acting.88
In stark contrast to al-Kidd, however, both Brosseau and Plumhoff involved
low-level officers who were required to make split-second decisions regarding
whether to fire their weapons at fleeing suspects. 89 As to these defendants, the
Supreme Court assessed their liability based solely upon a review of federal
appellate court precedent in a manner that was never intended in Harlow.90
In Brosseau, the Supreme Court considered a police officer's shooting of a
suspect as he attempted to flee in his vehicle.91 In concluding that qualified
immunity applied, the Supreme Court in Brosseau initially rejected the notion
that vague citations to the Fourth Amendment excessive force standard 92 served
to provide "fair warning" to the police officer that her actions were unlawful. 93
The Supreme Court observed that these cases were "cast at a high level of
generality," 94 and it reiterated its statement in the 1987 decision of Anderson v.
Creighton9 5 "that the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been
'clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense:
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right." 96
In evaluating the conduct of the defendant officer, the Supreme Court in
Brosseau then proceeded to review three Court of Appeals decisions that
allegedly dealt with the conduct in question. Given that this Article takes issue
with Brosseau's analysis, it will quote that decision's analysis of federal
appellate precedent in full:
The parties point us to only a handful of cases relevant to the 'situation
[Brosseau] confronted': whether to shoot a disturbed felon, set on

88. See id. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Wilson, 526 U.S. 603, 617; Mitchell v.
Forysth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)) (pointing out the
difficult legal analysis often required to interpret clearly established law by the Attorney General's
Office).
89. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2017-18 (2014) (citations omitted) (showing
that a police officer shot and killed plaintiffs father during a car chase); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
U.S. 194, 194 (2004) (per curiam) (stating that a police officer shot the plaintiff in the back while he
was fleeing the scene).
90. See Plumhoff 134 S. Ct. at 2024 (noting the lack of federal appellate court precedent to
distinguish the plaintiffs claim from the facts of Brosseau); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194,
199-201 (2004) (citations omitted) (analyzing federal appellate court decisions to find no clearly
established law).
91. See Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 194.
92. See id. at 199 (finding the facts of the present case to be far from the obvious use of
excessive force found in two prior cases).
93. Id. at 199 (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 339 F. 3d 857, 873-74 (9th Cir. 2003)).
94. Id. at 199.
95. 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
96. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).
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avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the
immediate area are at risk from that flight. Ibid. Specifically, Brosseau
points us to Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1993), and Smith v.
Freland, 954 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1992).
In these cases, the courts found no Fourth Amendment violation when
an officer shot a fleeing suspect who presented a risk to others. Cole v.
Bone, supra, at 1333 (holding the officer 'had probable cause to believe
that the truck posed an imminent threat of serious physical harm to
innocent motorists as well as to the officers themselves'); Smith v.
Freland, 954 F.2d, at 347 (noting 'a car can be a deadly weapon' and
holding the officer's decision to stop the car from possibly injuring
others was reasonable). Smith is closer to this case. There, the officer
and suspect engaged in a car chase, which appeared to be at an end
when the officer cornered the suspect at the back of a dead-end
residential street.- The suspect, however, freed his car and began
speeding down the street. At this point, the officer fired a shot, which
killed the suspect. The court held the officer's decision was reasonable
and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment. It noted that the
suspect, like Haugen here, 'had proven he would do almost anything to
avoid capture' and that he posed a major threat to, among others, the
officers at the end of the street.
Haugen points us to Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230 (7th Cir.
1993), where the court found summary judgment inappropriate on a
Fourth Amendment claim involving a fleeing suspect. There, the court
concluded that the threat created by the fleeing suspect's failure to brake
when an officer suddenly stepped in front of his just-started car was not
a sufficiently grave threat to justify the use of deadly force. Id. at 234.
These three cases taken together undoubtedly show that this area is one
in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case. None
of them squarely governs the case here; they do suggest that Brosseau's
actions fell in the 'hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.'
Saucier v. Katz, supra, at 206. The cases by no means 'clearly
establish' that Brosseau's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further
97
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

97. See id at 200-01 (citing Cole v. Bone, 993 F. 2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1993); Estates of Starks
v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 1993); Smith v. Freland, 954 F. 2d 343 (6th Cir. 1992)).
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Thus, the Supreme Court in Brosseau based its ruling entirely upon a review
of appellate court precedent, which it found did not clearly establish that the
defendant's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. 98
It should be noted that the Supreme Court in Brosseau did not even limit its
analysis to the precedent of the federal circuit in which the defendant officer
served, instead reviewing cases from three different federal circuits. 9 9 Once
again, the second part of the Harlow standard requires that the clearly settled
precedent be law of which a "reasonable person would have known."100 It seems
doubtful that there is even a single police officer in the nation who religiously
reads the decisions of federal appellate courts nationwide. Even assuming that
such an officer exists, it seems highly doubtful that the officer would have the
time or ability to review that authority in their mind when required to make a
decision regarding whether to fire their weapon at a fleeing suspect.
It therefore seems beyond dispute that, even if the Supreme Court in
Brosseau had found a federal court opinion directly on point which clearly
prohibited an officer in Brosseau's position from discharging her weapon, a
reasonable police officer would not have been aware of that authority. That
being the case, what is the point of reviewing the authority at all? There is none
that the writer can discern. The Supreme Court's analysis in Brosseau, thus,
seems plainly insufficient, even though the actual result of the case was clear
enough that only Justice Stevens dissented to it.' 0 This demonstrates that clear
cases can sometimes make bad law, and such is the case with Brosseau.
Another troubling aspect of Brosseau is the manner in which the Supreme
Court sought to distinguish one of its decisions, which had employed a far less
legalistic approach to qualified immunity. In the 2002 decision of Hope v.
Pelzer,102 the Supreme Court considered a case where prison guards handcuffed
a prisoner to a hitching post on two occasions, one of which lasted for seven
hours without regular water or bathroom breaks.o3 Among other facts, the
Supreme Court noted that "[a]t one point, a guard taunted him about his
thirst."l 04

Faced with these facts, six Supreme Court Justices concluded that the
Eleventh Circuit erred in concluding that the defense of qualified immunity was
available to the defendants. 05 The Court held that "[a]s the facts are alleged by
Hope, the Eighth Amendment violations [are] obvious."' 0 6

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Idat 200-01 (citations omitted).
Id. at 201.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
See Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 202-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
536 U.S. 730 (2002).
Id. at 738 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
Id. at 735.
See id. at 745-46 (quoting U.S. v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)).
Id. at 738.
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The Supreme Court in Hope thus found that qualified immunity was not
available to the defendants, even though there were no prior federal appellate
court decisions which had found the specific conduct in question to be
unlawful.10

7

While the results in both Brosseau and Hope seem entirely defensible, the
differences in the analysis which the Supreme Court employed to reach those
results are striking. This fact has not gone unnoticed by legal scholars. In his
treatise FederalJurisdiction,Chemerinsky writes that:
There is an obvious tension between Hope v. Pelzer, declaring that there
need not be a case on point to overcome qualified immunity, and
Brosseau v. Haugen and Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, finding qualified immunity
based on the lack of a case on point.. . . Not surprisingly, there is great
confusion in the lower courts as to whether and when cases on point are
needed to overcome qualified immunity. 08
This writer can certainly confirm Chemerinsky's observation regarding the
"great confusion"' 09 at the trial court level regarding the applicable qualified
immunity standard.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's attempt in Brosseau to explain its
differing analysis in Hope did very little to provide clarity in this regard.I1 0 The
majority in Brosseau explained the Court's differing analysis two years earlier
by writing that "in an obvious case, these standards can 'clearly establish' the
answer, even without a body of relevant case law." 1 These do not appear to
simply be throw away words; to the contrary, they seem to represent the
Supreme Court's best explanation as to why it had required case law specifically
on point in some qualified immunity cases but not in others.
Establishing an "obvious case" exception to the requirement of "relevant
case law"ll2 seems quite unsatisfying since, in many cases, reasonable minds
will differ regarding whether the case is, in fact, obvious. The majority in
Brosseau offered Hope as being an example of such an obvious case, but it
should be noted that three of the Justices in the Brosseau majority dissented in
Hope," 3 and the Eleventh Circuit reached a different result in its consideration

107. See id at 739.
108. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION

§ 8.6, at 580

(6th ed. 2012).

109. Id.
110. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam).
I11. Id.
112. Id
113. Compare id. at 194 (showing a per curiam opinion with only Justice Stevens dissenting),
with Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 748-64 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (showing a dissenting
opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss2/6

20

Weems: Questioning the U.S. Supreme Court's Legalistic Qualified Immunit
2014]

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY APPROACH

563

of the case.' 14 This demonstrates that whether or not a case is obvious is often in
the eyes of the beholder. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Brosseau
provided no standards to assist courts in determining whether or not a case is
obvious.
It is submitted that Hope would have been an obvious case under a qualified
immunity standard which allowed the consideration of subjective factors as it did
prior to Harlow. Given the actual qualified immunity standard that the Eleventh
Circuit was required to apply, however, it is not difficult to discern why the
Court ruled the way it did. The Supreme Court emphasized in Anderson v.
Creighton that to defeat qualified immunity citations to broad prohibitions
against excessive force and similar misconduct is insufficient, and that "the right
the official is alleged to have violated must have been 'clearly established' in a
more particularized . . . sense." 115 In light of these words, one can understand
why the Eleventh Circuit would have felt that the plaintiff needed a "hitching
post" case in order to defeat qualified immunity.116
In this sense, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Hope to award qualified
immunity to guards who apparently took sadistic pleasure in tying a prisoner to a
hitching post was an unfortunate, yet predictable, casualty of the Supreme
Court's legalistic qualified immunity approach.
Brosseau's obvious case
exception seems unlikely to alleviate confusion among lower courts in this
regard. It is submitted that the Supreme Court did not clarify the contradictions
between Hope and Brosseau because there was no clarity that could be given.
Indeed, there is no apparent way to resolve the fundamental contradictions in the
Supreme Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence, which has its origins in a
determination to greatly limit the factors which may be considered in qualified
immunity cases in the interest of deciding those issues more quickly.
Brosseau was merely one opinion of the Supreme Court, and it is frequently
the case that the Court's decisions are soon distinguished or limited to their facts.
Such is not the case with Brosseau, however, as the Supreme Court appeared to
firmly endorse its analysis in its May 2014 decision in Plumhoff " In Plumhoff
the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Sixth Circuit's ruling that the
defendant police officers violated the Fourth Amendment in -using deadly
force," 8 and it alternatively held that qualified immunity would still exist." 9
The Supreme Court described the facts in Plumhoff as follows:

114. See Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 977 (1lth Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)
(affirming the trial court's ruling in favor of the defendant's motion for summary judgment based
on qualified immunity).
115. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
116. See Hope, 240 F.3d at 981 (finding a violation of a constitutional right but still allowing
the guards qualified immunity).
117. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014) (citing Brosseau, 543 U.S. at
197).
118. See id at 2024.
119. See id
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Donald Rickard led police officers on a high-speed car chase that came
to a temporary halt when Rickard spun out into a parking lot. Rickard
resumed maneuvering his car, and as he continued to use the accelerator
even though his bumper was flush against a patrol car, an officer fired
three shots into Rickard's car. Rickard managed to drive away, almost
hitting an officer in the process. Officers fired 12 more shots as Rickard
sped away, striking him and his passenger, both of whom died from
some combination of gunshot wounds and injuries suffered when the car
eventually crashed.
Respondent, Rickard's minor daughter, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action,
alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments.1 20
As this Article did with Brosseau, it will quote Plumhoffs qualified
immunity analysis at length:
An official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless it
is shown that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that
was 'clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct. And a
defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right
unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable
official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was
violating it. In other words, 'existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question' confronted by the official 'beyond
debate.' In addition, '[w]e have repeatedly told courts . .. not to define
clearly established law at a high level of generality,' since doing so
avoids the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the
particular circumstances that he or she faced. We think our decision in
Brosseau v. Haugen squarely demonstrates that no clearly established
law precluded petitioners' conduct at the time in question. In Brosseau,
we held that a police officer did not violate clearly established law when
she fired at a fleeing vehicle to prevent possible harm to 'other officers
on foot who [she] believed were in the immediate area, . . . occupied
vehicles in [the driver's] path[,] and .. . any other citizens who might be
in the area ... .After surveying lower court decisions regarding the
reasonableness of lethal force as a response to vehicular flight, we
observed that this is an area 'in which the result depends very much on
the facts of each case' and that the cases 'by no means "clearly
establish[ed]" that [the officer's] conduct violated the Fourth
Amendment.' In reaching that conclusion, we held that Garner and

120. Id. at 2014-15.
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Graham, which are 'cast at a high level of generality,' did not clearly
establish that the officer's decision was unreasonable.
Brosseau makes plain that as of February 21, 1999-the date of the
events at issue in that case-it was not clearly established that it was
unconstitutional to shoot a fleeing driver to protect those whom his
flight might endanger. We did not consider later decided cases because
they 'could not have given fair notice to [the officer].' To defeat
immunity here, then, respondent must show at a minimum either (1) that
the officers' conduct in this case was materially different from the
conduct in Brosseau or (2) that between February 21, 1999, and July 18,
2004, there emerged either 'controlling authority' or a 'robust
"consensus of cases of persuasive authority,"' that would alter our
analysis of the qualified immunity question. Respondent has made
neither showing. 1
The Supreme Court in Plumhoff then proceeded to analyze the facts of the
case and concluded that they were not materially distinguishable from Brosseau,
and that, indeed, they appeared more favorable for the defendants than in that
case.

122

The facts of Brosseau and Plumhoff are quite similar,123 and it is
understandable that the Supreme Court would have relied upon the former
decision in the latter case. Given that twelve years had passed between the two
decisions, however, it is disappointing that the Supreme Court did not even hint
in Plumhoff that the Brosseau analysis might be wanting. Even more concerning
is the fact that, once again, the Supreme Court in Plumhoff did not even mention
the second part of the Harlow standard in its analysis or question whether the
standard made sense in the context of claims against low-level officers.1 24 It
should be noted that, aside from Brosseau, the only other qualified immunity
case which the Court relied upon in Plumhoff was al-Kidd, and the Supreme
Court gave no indication that there might be fundamental differences between
the facts of al-Kidd and those in Brosseau and Plumhoff which called for a
different standard to be employed.
Brosseau and Plumhoff were either 8-1 or unanimous decisions,1 and it
should be apparent that, factually speaking, the cases were not particularly close
ones. This raises the question of how the Court would apply the Harlow

121. Id at 2023 (citations omitted).
122. See id at 2023-24 (quoting Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 206 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
123. See id at 2023-24 (comparing the facts in that case to those in Brosseau).
124. See id. at 2022-24 (citations omitted) (analyzing officer's qualified immunity using rules
from the al-Kidd and Brosseau cases rather than the standard set forth in Harlow).
125. See id at 2023 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080, 2083-84 (2011)).
126. See id at 2016; Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 202 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (showing that Justice
Stevens was the only Justice who did not join the per curiam opinion, creating an 8-1 split).
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standard in a closer case. One such case was Anderson v. Creighton, in which an
FBI agent performed a warrantless search of a house based upon an incorrect
suspicion that a bank robber was hiding there.127 It is submitted that, as a policy
matter, Anderson was a genuinely close case because while the agent's actions
did appear to be contrary to clearly established Fourth Amendment precedent,
there was a reasonable argument that he was simply performing his job duties as
he understood them and was not knowingly violating the law.128 Moreover,
there was no proof of the sort of sadistic behavior that was present in Hope. 29It
is submitted that reasonable arguments can be made both ways as to whether,
under circumstances such as these, the law should force the agent to personally
bear the burdens of litigation.
The Eighth Circuit in Anderson concluded that the law should do so, holding
that it was clearly established at the time that the Fourth Amendment prohibited
warrantless searches, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, and that
qualified immunity accordingly did not apply.1 30 Three dissenting Supreme
Court Justices in Anderson agreed with the Eighth Circuit that qualified
immunity did not apply. 31 For its part, the majority in Anderson appeared to
agree with the Eighth Circuit's evaluation of the law as a broad proposition, but
it concluded that the appellate court did not frame the legal issue correctly in the
qualified immunity context.132 The majority wrote that in the qualified immunity
context, the right allegedly violated "'must have been clearly established' in a
more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: the contours of the right
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what
he is doing violates that right."l 3 3
Perhaps tellingly, the majority in Anderson supported this proposition with a
rather extensive analysis, but seemed highly reluctant to actually apply its
standard to the facts of the case, instead remanding the district court to do so.134
One wonders whether the six Justice majority in Anderson could survive the
actual application of its "'clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence

127. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 637 (1987).
128. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES

§

9A.03(A), at 9A-19 (4th ed. Supp. 2012) (quoting Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 15 (1st Cir.
1978)).
129. Compare Anderson, 483 U.S. at 637 (recounting that the agent-defendant "conducted a
warrantless search" of the plaintiffs' home under the mistaken belief that "a man suspected of a
bank robbery committed earlier that day, might be found there."), with Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
730, 733-35 (2002) (stating that the plaintiff "was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment"
when guards handcuffed him to a post twice, once for two hours and another time for seven hours).
130. See Creighton v. City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d 1269, 1277 (8th Cir. 1985), vacated, 483 U.S.
635, 649 (1987).
131. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132. See id at 640-41.
133. Id. at 640.
134. See id at 640-41, 646 (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)).
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more relevant, sense"' 3 5 standard to the facts of a genuinely close case. The
Anderson standard is a quite vague one, and it is submitted that what exactly the
Court meant by the previously quoted words could only be seen through their
application. It does not lend itself to confidence in the standard that the Supreme
Court did not even attempt to do so. It is submitted that Anderson's requirement
that the law be clearly established in a particularized sense sounds much better in
theory than it actually works in practice.1 36 This is partly because appellate
courts do a much better job of clearly establishing general principles of law than
they do in clearly establishin particularized ones, which may vary depending
upon the proof of each case. 3
In Brosseau and Plumhoff the Supreme Court seemed even more reluctant
to address another issue: that "of which a reasonable person would have known"
language used in Harlow.
It is not difficult to understand why. Under
ordinary English usage, the "of which" language in the Harlow standard clearly
suggests that the specific law which the Court finds to be clearly established
would have been known to a reasonable person in the defendant's position. As
previously mentioned, however, this standard simply breaks down as a relevant
factor when applied to the typical low-level officer, such as the police officers in
Brosseau and Plumhoff 139
The Supreme Court in Brosseau spent a few paragraphs discussing the state
of circuit court precedent, 140 but it did not even mention the fact which seems
obvious that, regardless of the state of the precedent, a reasonable police officer
would not have been aware of it. Presumably, the Supreme Court recognized
that it would have made a poor impression to simply hold that "whatever the
circuit courts have held on this issue, a reasonable officer would not have been
aware of it, and qualified immunity therefore applies."l 4 1 Such a holding could
have been made in a single sentence, and would have saved the Supreme Court
and the reader considerable time. The holding would have been intellectually

135. Id at 640.
136. Id.
137. Id
138. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Plumhoffv. Rickard, 134 S. Ct.
2012, 2023 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083-84 (2011); Brosseau v. Haugen,
543 U.S. 194, 200 n.4 (2004)) (examining the limited analysis from Brosseau and its application to
the facts of this case).
139. See Plumhoff 134 S. Ct. at 2023-24 (quoting Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 206 n.4 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F3d 1323, 1331 (1lth Cir. 2003)) (applying the reasonableness
standard to the facts by stating that the facts are indistinguishable from those in Brosseau and using
the Brosseau Court's analysis); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199 (stating the "case is far from obvious" in
regards to the standard of what a reasonable officer would have known).
140. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199-201 (citations omitted).
141. This would likely have been the holding had the Supreme Court not addressed the Circuit
Court precedent.
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honest, but it would have made the deficiencies in the applicable legal standard
clearer than they already are.
In this sense, the Brosseau-Plumhoffapproach often seems to constitute so
much sound and fury, signifying nothing. The standard kicks up a considerable
amount of legal dust and makes it appear that a relevant legal analysis is taking
place when, very frequently, it is not. It could be argued, since the Supreme
Court in Brosseau and Plumhoff found there was no clearly established law
prohibiting the defendants' actions,142 that it was unnecessary for the Court to
even address the issue of whether a reasonable defendant would have known of
the law. That argument might be valid if Brosseau and Plumhoff were district
court opinions. However, Brosseau and Plumhoff are Supreme Court decisions
to which federal courts nationwide will be looking for coherent standards to
apply in numerous Section 1983 cases before them involving low-level officers.
It is therefore quite concerning that, in both of those decisions, the Supreme
Court offered up a highly legalistic version of the Harlow standard which is
quite obviously not well suited for the inquiry at hand.1 4 3
It may be true that, given the rather clear results in both Brosseau and
Plumhoff the Supreme Court could get away with the highly narrow analysis
which it offered in those decisions and still be technically correct. However, the
Supreme Court could only do so by ignoring the obvious issues, which will
confront district courts in cases where the circuit court precedent does clearly
establish a particular point of law and a low-level officer raises Harlow's
extraordinary circumstances defense, arguing that a reasonable officer in his
position would have been unaware of that law. What then?
It appears that Anderson was a case where the law clearly prohibited the
officer's conduct, but the majority in that case offered nothing more than legal
generalities and refused to actually apply those generalities to the facts of the
case. 144 Based on Anderson and Brosseau-Plumhoff, one wonders whether the
Supreme Court has adopted a policy of deliberate ambiguity that seeks to avoid
dealing with the logical inconsistencies in the qualified immunity standard it has
adopted. Assuming this is the case, it is submitted that the Supreme Court will
only be able to kick the can down the road for so long.
In so contending, this writer reiterates that Harlow's "of which a reasonable
person would have known" language was not mere dicta.1 45 To the contrary, the
Supreme Court wrote in Harlow that:
If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily
should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know
the law governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading the

142. See Plumhoff 134 S. Ct. at 2024; Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201.
143. See Plumhoff 134 S. Ct. at 2023 (citations omitted); Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198-201
(citations omitted).
144. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-41 (1986) (citations omitted).
145. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he
neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the
defense should be sustained. But again, the defense would turn
primarily on objective factors.146
Thus, the Supreme Court in Harlow was quite clear that it was not indulging
in some legal fiction that a defendant was aware of the status of legal precedent.
Rather, it specifically provided for an extraordinary circumstances defense in
cases where the defendant could demonstrate that a reasonable official in his
position would not have been aware of the authority in question. This language
is central to this Article's contention that Brosseau and Plumhoff misapplied
Harlow, since it is clearly more than dicta and cannot logically be reconciled
with the Brosseau-Plumhoffapproach. Indeed, the Supreme Court's assumption
in Harlow that the ordinary public official would know of the relevant legal
authority strongly suggests that it did not envision an inquiry similar to that in
Brosseau and Plumhoff whereby the conduct of low-level police officers is
147
judged on the basis of federal appellate court case law.
The fundamental inconsistency between Harlow and the Brosseau-Plumhoff
approach can be demonstrated through a hypothetical. Assume that the circuit
court decisions analyzed by the Supreme Court in Brosseau found similar
shootings to be unconstitutional. Presumably, the Supreme Court would have
found the law to be clearly established that the shooting in Brosseau was in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. If Harlow's extraordinary circumstances
defense means what it says, however, then what would have prevented the
defendant officer in Brosseau from demonstrating, as she no doubt could have,
that a reasonable officer would not have been aware of that authority? Perhaps
she could have commissioned a reliable, independent poll of one hundred police
officers, which would very likely have demonstrated that none of them had heard
of any of the circuit court decisions. The plaintiff almost certainly could not
have demonstrated otherwise. Faced with this proof, on what basis might a court
have denied qualified immunity on the basis of the extraordinary circumstances
defense? None as far as this writer can discern. Thus, taken to its logical
conclusion, the Brosseau-Plumhoff approach of basing liability upon federal
appellate court authority would seemingly provide for blanket immunity of lowlevel officers in a wide range of contexts because whatever the federal circuit

146. Id. at 818-19.
147. Compare id. at 819 (stating that "a reasonably competent public official should know the
law governing his conduct"), with Plumhoff 134 S. Ct. at 2023 (quoting Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201)
(adopting the Brosseau approach based on that court's analysis of "lower court decisions regarding
the reasonableness of lethal force as a response to vehicular flight"), and Brosseau, 543 U.S. at
200-01 (quoting Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1993); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d
1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993); Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992)) (stating that
immunity would not protect an officer's use of deadly force if the officer "unreasonably created the
encounter").
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courts might have held on the issue at hand, a reasonable officer would not be
aware of it. The Supreme Court clearly did not intend such a result in Harlow,
and the inconsistencies between that decision and the Brosseau-Plumhoff
approach are thus evident.
In retrospect, one can identify the moment in which the Supreme Court,
largely by accident it seems, extended the Harlow holding to low-level officers.
In their dissent in Anderson v. Creighton, three Justices strongly objected to the
"uncritical application of the precedents of qualified immunity that we have
developed for a quite different group of high public office holders" to a
comparatively low-level FBI agent.148 These dissenting Justices argued, as this
Article has argued, that "[t]he considerations underlying the formulation of the
immunity rule in Harlow for Executive Branch officials . . . are quite distinct
from those that led the Court to its prior recognition of immunity for federal
law
49
enforcement officials in suits against them founded on the Constitution." 1
Plainly, the dissenting Justices in Anderson interpreted Harlow as merely
dealing with qualified immunity in the context of high level-officials, and
objected to what they regarded as its expansion to low-level officers.1 50 In
response, the majority in Anderson criticized what it characterized as:

'

the emptiness of the dissent's assertion that "[t]oday this Court makes
the fundamental error of simply assuming that Harlow immunity is just
as appropriate for federal law enforcement officers .. . as it is for high
government officials." Post, at 3046 (footnote omitted). Just last Term
the Court unanimously held that state and federal law enforcement
officers were protected by the qualified immunity described in Harlow.
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).
We see no reason to overrule that holding.15
The dissenting Justices in Anderson issued a rebuttal to the majority's
response, disagreeing that Malley had applied Harlow to low-level officers:
The Court asserts that this assumption merely reflects our holding last
Term in Malley v. Briggs. The Malley case, however, rejected a police
officer's claim that he was entitled to absolute immunity because he had
acted pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by a magistrate. We

148. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 649 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524, 535
(1985); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816-18 (1982)) (stating that immunity should not apply since the
policy concerns of "allowing government officials to devote their time and energy to the press of
public business without the burden and distractions . . . of a lawsuit," and "the special unfairness
associated with charging government officials with knowledge of a rule of law that had not yet been
clearly recognized" laid out in the Harlow and Mitchell cases were not present in the present case).
151. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 642 n.4 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 654 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986)).
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specifically declined to accept the petitioner's invitation 'to expand what
was a qualified immunity at common law into an absolute immunity.'
We concluded that in 'the case of the officer applying for a warrant' a
rule of qualified immunity based on the Harlow standard would give
'ample room for mistaken judgments.' Our opinion carefully avoided
any comment on warrantless searches or the proper application of
Harlow in cases in which the claim of 'qualified immunity' could not be
evaluated in advance of discovery. 152
It appears to this writer that the truth lies somewhere in the middle.
It is argued that the majority in Anderson was correct that the Court had
applied Harlow to a low-level officer in Malley, but it seems clear that it did so
without considering whether the actual logic of the Harlow holding made sense
in that context. Indeed, it is apparent from the Anderson dissent, written a mere
year after Malley, that at least three-and likely more-of the Supreme Court
Justices were completely unaware of the implications of applying Harlow to
low-level officers. Moreover, the majority in Anderson never substantively
responded to the dissent's belated objections in this regard, instead saying that
the issue was now settled. This is hardly a ringing endorsement of the logic
behind applying Harlow's standard to low-level officers, and it does not seem a
stretch to regard the Supreme Court's decision to do so in Malley as being an
accidental holding of sorts which has never been justified on its merits.
At the same time, Harlow itself bears a considerable portion of the blame for
its subsequent misapplication. The Supreme Court in Harlow should have
recognized that its holding did not make sense as applied to low-level officers,
and specifically limited it to high-level executive officials. The Court failed to
do so, and it is therefore rather predictable that it would have simply applied the
Harlow standard to a low-level officer when such a defendant came before it in
Malley. It was not until Anderson that the dissenting Justices realized, to their
alarm, the implications of extending Harlow to low-level officers. However, by
then the majority could claim, in light of Malley, that the horse had left the barn.
It is submitted that scenarios such as this are how bad law becomes worse law.
To use a rough analogy, Harlow can be compared to a box labeled "tools"
which, upon being opened, is found to contain only wrenches. The Supreme
Court in Malley, confronted with a rather basic job, appears to have opened the
box and hammered a nail with a wrench without giving much thought to the
matter. Faced with a more precise job in Anderson, the dissent wondered out
loud why the Court was hammering nails with wrenches, to which the majority
essentially responded that they settled that in Malley these are not wrenches, but
rather are tools. Somewhat alarmingly, the Supreme Court in the Brosseau and
Plumhoff decisions no longer appeared to notice that it was hammering nails
with wrenches, nor did it appear to notice the damage that was being done to the

152. Id. at 654 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 340, 342-43).
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boards in the process. It is submitted that no matter how many times the
Supreme Court states that the Harlow box contains tools, the fact remains that, in
reality, it contains only wrenches. Federal district courts need more varied tools
to deal with the diverse qualified immunity issues they face.
The fact that the majority in Anderson refused to engage with the dissent on
the substance of its objections to applying Harlow to low-level officers, in the
context of an opinion in which it refused to actually apply the vague standard it
was adopting, heightens concerns that the Supreme Court may have adopted a
policy of deliberate ambiguity which leaves it to district courts to sort out the
clear contradictions in the Court's qualified immunity standards. These concerns
are not assuaged by Brosseau's announcement of an obvious case exception,
which is a term that has no practical meaning that this writer can discern.
Ultimately, it is immaterial when and how the Harlow standard was expanded to
low-level officers since the actual words in the standard remain the same
regardless. By its clear terms, the Harlow standard only applies to clearly
established precedent "of which a reasonable person would have known."
Those words mean what they mean and that meaning will not change even if the
Supreme. Court continues to ignore them, as in Brosseau and Plumhoff, or seeks
refuge in prior decisions, as in Anderson.
One treatise correctly notes that the Supreme Court in Harlow "failed to
explain what might constitute 'extraordinary circumstances,' as have the
numerous post-Harlow Supreme Court qualified immunity decisions."l 54 The
reader is urged to consider the implications of this statement. Harlow set forth
its qualified immunity standard in 1982, and the Supreme Court has thus avoided
explaining, for over thirty years, what an integral part of this standard actually
means. It is difficult to discern how the Court's sustained failure to do so,
despite many opportunities, could have been inadvertent. Qualified immunity is
one of the most important doctrines in federal civil litigation, and the meaning of
the governing standard in this context is far too important for the Court to keep
hidden. The Supreme Court's narrow analysis in its 2014 Plumhoff decision
suggests that it plans to continue, for the foreseeable future, a policy of
deliberate ambiguity motivated by an apparent desire to avoid confronting the
defects in the qualified immunity standard.
This Article was written partly to encourage the Supreme Court to address,
and hopefully correct, the deficiencies in its qualified immunity standard rather
than continue to ignore them. The writer emphasizes that while Brosseau and
Plumhoff have been criticized for failing to recognize the actual intent behind the
Harlow standard, this Article would not have been written if the writer felt that,
on its merits, the Brosseau-Plumhoffapproach was fundamentally a good one.
Deviating from a prior decision is not necessarily a bad thing if the deviation
takes the law in a positive direction. It is submitted that the Brosseau-Plumhoff

153. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
154. SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, at § 9A.04[B], at 9A-49 (4th ed. Supp. 2012).
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approach does not. Brosseau and Plumhoffexist on a plane in which the answers
to difficult and particularized legal questions lie in federal appellate court case
law and, if that precedent fails to provide clarity, then that in and of itself
resolves the qualified immunity issue. This approach reflects an appellate court
bias, which fails to take account of the realities of Section 1983 litigation. It is
submitted that the highly legalistic Brosseau-Plumhoffapproach will often force
federal judges to massage appellate court precedent to reach results that they
deem fair based upon more practical considerations and, at other times, it will
simply result in bad decisions and unfair results.
IV. CONCLUSION

The issues described in this Article involve one problem with two causes
and, fortunately, one solution. The problem is that the Supreme Court has
utilized Harlow's qualified immunity standard well beyond the context of highlevel executive officials to which it logically applies, and to which it was
intended to apply. There are two causes for this problem, namely: (1) Harlow's
failure to more narrowly tailor its actual holding to its analysis, and (2) the
Supreme Court's subsequent misapplication of the standard to contexts, in
particular Section 1983 actions against low-level officers facing emergency
situations, in which its analysis of legal precedent simply does not make sense
and was not intended to apply.
The solution to this problem is a relatively simple one, which can be
implemented consistently with principles of stare decisis. The solution is to limit
the Harlow standard's inquiry to the context in which it was intended to apply,
and to develop a different qualified immunity standard that makes sense as
applied to low-level officers. It is submitted that Malley's repeatedly quoted
phrase that qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law"155 captures the essence of the qualified
immunity inquiry and could serve as a starting point for a qualified immunity
standard for low-level officers.
Utilizing Malley's language as the heart of any new qualified immunity
standard would have the significant benefit of simply applying the Supreme
Court's own words which have already been repeatedly cited by federal courts.
Indeed, a Westlaw search of federal court opinions found a remarkable 4,557
opinions that quote this phrase. It is submitted that these words have found such
a warm reception among federal judges because they give them license to
consider the sort of factors that federal judges are naturally predisposed to
consider in qualified immunity cases.
The Malley standard could be
supplemented with additional factors, including an analysis of federal appellate
court authority when such is deemed relevant.

155. Malley, 475 U.S. at 341.
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Utilizing the Malley standard would allow federal judges to make a
commonsensical evaluation of the cases before them without going through the
judicially inefficient and, even worse, frequently misleading process of
incorporating authority from various circuits. It should be noncontroversial to
state that federal appellate judges sometimes reach incorrect results and, even
when they do not, there are usually important distinguishing factors between any
two cases. Utilizing the Malley standard would allow district judges to focus
their attention squarely on the cases before them, while still considering and
applying the general principles of law established by federal appellate courts.
It is true that an application of the Malley standard would often require
district judges to make gut decisions regarding whether a defendant's alleged
actions were sufficiently incompetent or knowingly violative of the law to negate
qualified immunity, but it is submitted that this is largely the nature of the
qualified immunity beast. If one wishes for district judges to decide qualified
immunity issues at an early stage of the proceedings, and the U.S. Supreme
Court clearly does, then this will inevitably require district judges to make gut
decisions under any standard. This Article contends that the law would best be
served by a standard which focuses district judges' judgment upon the cases
before them, rather than trying to shoehorn those cases into often distinguishable
holdings from various circuits. If a litigant contends that a district judge made
an erroneous decision in this regard, then that is why appellate courts exist.
The Malley standard may not be perfect, but it clearly provides a much
better starting point for analyzing the conduct of low-level officers than the
legalistic approach followed in Brosseau and Plumhoff Indeed, it does not seem
coincidental that the Supreme Court spoke these words in Malley, the same
decision that applied Harlow to low-level officers in the first place. It is
submitted, however, that the words, represent the application of the qualified
immunity doctrine to low-level officers as the Supreme Court wished it to be
rather than what Harlow actually held. While not as legalistic a standard as
Brosseau and Plumhoff would seem to indicate, the Harlow standard clearly does
not allow federal judges to consider a number of factors which would otherwise
be important to them in deciding qualified immunity issues.156
It is further submitted that the Supreme Court should take the occasion of
establishing separate qualified immunity standards for low-level officers as an
opportunity to consider whether Harlow's prohibition against considering
subjective factors should apply in the low-level context. Harlow dealt with
qualified immunity in a context where one man's loyal presidential aide,
following the orders of President Nixon, was another man's willful constitutional
violator who knowingly infringed upon citizens' due process rights.157 It seems

156. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)) (stating
that "[b]y defining the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective terms," all policy and
legal objectives of the standard are met).
157. See id. at 802, 804.
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clear that Harlow was motivated largely by the Supreme Court's desire to wash
its hands of such thorny issues, but that, in so doing, it threw out the baby with
the bathwater. Harlow has conditioned federal judges to almost recoil from the
word "subjective" in deciding qualified immunity issues, but this Article has
demonstrated that the subjective inquiry was once universally accepted by
Supreme Court Justices as being a valid part of the qualified immunity analysis
and was never rejected on its merits.'ss
In truth, subjective proof of malice is not nearly as thorny an issue in the
typical Section 1983 case as it was in Harlow. In the typical case, it comes down
to something as basic as whether an officer was trying, in good faith, to make an
arrest to protect the public or whether he was using the occasion of an arrest as
an outlet for his sadistic tendencies.
In cases where the proof clearly suggests
that the latter is the case, what interest is served by instructing federal judges to
simply ignore that proof? This writer submits that many federal judges are
highly influenced by such proof today, even though the governing legal
standards require them to hide it in their opinions. The Eleventh Circuit's
opinion in Hope suggests that some federal judges are not in on the joke, and
simply take the Supreme Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence at face value,
often resulting in unfair results.1 60
Federal judges badly need a qualified immunity standard that does not
require them to play disingenuous games in their opinions, and which allows
them to make a practical, rather than highly legalistic, evaluation of the issues
before them. Moreover, regardless of its limitations, the Harlow standard was
fashioned to deal with the liability of high-level officials and, properly applied, is
largely self-limited to that context.161 The Brosseau-Plumhoffapproach applies
Harlow well beyond its proper limits and, in so doing, provides a poor basis for
analyzing qualified immunity issues involving low-level officers. It is hoped
that the Supreme Court will come to recognize the limitations in the BrosseauPlumhoff approach and provide district courts with more workable and relevant
qualified immunity standards in cases involving low-level officers.

158. See, e.g, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (adopting a subjective standard
of whether or not the official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within
his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights" of another to determine
immunity).
159. Compare Plumhoffv. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023, 2024 (holding that a police officer
was entitled to immunity after using deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect after "a lengthy,
high-speed pursuit that indisputably posed a danger both to the officers involved and to any
civilians who happened to be nearby"), with Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 733, 737 (2002) (holding
that immunity did not apply to prison guards who subjected an inmate to cruel and unusual
punishment by handcuffing him to a post twice as a punishment for disruptive conduct).
160. See Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 981 (1lth Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)
(holding that "[d]espite the unconstitutionality of the . . . guards' actions, there was no clear, brightline test established in 1995 that would survive our circuit's qualified immunity analysis").
161. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967))
(discussing and applying the immunity standard in the limited context of high-level government

officials).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

33

*

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 6

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss2/6

34

Weems: Questioning the U.S. Supreme Court's Legalistic Qualified Immunit

ORDER THROUGH HEIN!
Get your missing back volumes and issues
through Hein!

We have obtained the entire back stock, electronic,
reprint and microform rights to ...

South Carolina
Law Review

Complete sets to date are available now!
We can also furnish single volumes and issues!

BACK ISSUES ALSO AVAILABLE
IN HEIN-ON-LINE!
http://heinonline.org

Fred B. Rothman & Co.
Acme-Nebrich Bookbindery
Fred 0. Dennis & Co.
Metro Self-Storage

PrimusInter Pares

WILLIAM S. HEIN & CO., INC.
Law Publisher/Serial& SubscriptionAgent/ Micropublisher
New & Used Law Books / PreservationPrinter/ Bookbinder
1285 Main Street, Buffalo, New York 14209
(716) 882-2600 * TOLL FREE (800) 828-7571 * Fax (716) 883-8100
E- Mail mail@wshein.com * Web Site www.wshein.com

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

35

*

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 6

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol66/iss2/6

36

